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February 16, 2005

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel to its
Land Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]
Abstract: Exactions occur when applications to develop parcels of land require
governmental permission, and that permission is conditioned upon dedicating
part of the land to public use. Exactions have long been challenged as
regulatory takings, and both federal and state courts look at these types of
regulations with a heightened level of scrutiny due to the nature of exactions to
remove a crucial element from the bundle of property rights associated with
ownership of real property: the right to exclude. This column discusses a recent
example of exactions jurisprudence applied in New York and goes on to compare
that decision in that case to a long history of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence.
***
In Smith v. Town of Mendon, the Court of Appeals held that a
conservation restriction imposed as a condition to site plan approval is not an
exaction and is not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny when challenged as a
regulatory taking. 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 3854 (December 21, 2004). The Mendon
Planning Board conditioned its approval of the Smiths’ single family home
proposal on the filing of conservation restriction covering portions of the parcel
located within the Town’s environmental protection overlay districts. The Town
previously had established four overlay districts that cover sensitive lands that
contain steep slopes or border on major creeks, wooded areas, or floodplains.
The overlay district provisions prohibit development and other land disturbing
activities unless the landowner can show that a proposed activity will not
adversely affect the protected resources.
The actual construction of the Smiths’ home would not adversely affect the
environment as long as no development occurred in the overlay districts.
Nonetheless, the Planning Board found that the conservation restriction was
needed to “’put subsequent buyers on notice that the property contains restraints
which may limit development within these environmentally sensitive areas’” and

would “provide the most meaningful and responsible means of protecting the
[property in the overlay districts].” Smith, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 3854 at *3.
The conservation restriction mirrors the effect of the overlay district
regulations by prohibiting construction on sensitive lands. It adds to those
regulations by allowing town inspectors to enter the property, upon 30 days
notice, to inspect conditions in the constrained areas. The restriction also
encumbers the property in perpetuity, which would survive the Town’s elimination
or relaxation of the overlay district rules. Further, the conservation restriction
provides the Town with legal ability to bring an injunction to enforce the
restriction, adding to its zoning powers to issue citations and seek civil and
criminal penalties.
The Smiths commenced an action asserting that the conservation
restriction amounted to an unconstitutional taking. At issue was whether the
restriction constitutes an exaction and thus requires a heightened standard of
review. The Court of Appeals supported the Town’s argument that such a zoning
condition is not an exaction and therefore is not subject to heightened scrutiny.
In the Mendon decision, the Court of Appeals provides the bar with an instructive
restatement of U.S. Supreme Court takings jurisprudence.
Total Takings
“The first and perhaps most critical factor in the [Supreme] Court’s taking
analyses [is] whether the regulation deprived landowners of ‘all economically
viable use’ of their property.” Smith at *8 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999)). Courts apply a heightened
degree of scrutiny when reviewing a regulation that allows an owner no viable
use of his property. Such regulations may be said to constitute a “total taking”
and to implicate the constitutional guarantee that property will not be confiscated
for public use without just compensation. The United States Supreme Court has
said that in the “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017
(1992). In such cases, there is a “heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.” Id. at 1018. Unless the regulator can show that the use prohibited
by the regulation would not be allowed under nuisance law or “background
principles of property law,” or is inherent in the title to the land, a regulation that
prohibits all beneficial use will be considered a regulatory taking. Id. at 1029.
Penn Central/Agins Standard
“If the contested regulation falls short of eliminating all economically viable
uses of the encumbered property, the Court looks to several factors to determine

whether a taking occurred, including ‘the regulation’s economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with the reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.’”
Smith at *8 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). When the
character of the government action is that of a traditional zoning restriction, the
standard articulated in Agins v. City of Tiburon applies. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In
that case, the Court held that the “application of a general zoning law to particular
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests.” Smith at *8.
Exactions
The Smiths argued that a conservation restriction is an exaction and that
the Town’s action should not be reviewed under the less stringent Penn
Central/Agins test. Exaction cases trigger stricter judicial scrutiny because the
right to exclude – a fundamental property right – is implicated. An exaction is a
condition imposed on the issuance of a development approval that requires the
developer to dedicate land to the public, to allow the public access to his private
land, or to pay a fee in lieu of such requirements. Relatively few land use laws or
decisions force the owner to convey an easement or portion of the title to the
public to allow public access. Where they do, the regulator must show that there
is an essential nexus between the condition imposed and the public purpose that
is to be achieved by the condition. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987). Courts also require individualized impact studies showing that
public benefits obtained by the condition imposed on the property are “roughly
proportional” to the adverse impacts of the development on the community.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Applicability of this heightened
degree of judicial scrutiny is limited to these conveyance cases. In Bonnie Briar
Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck, the Court of Appeals explicitly restricted the use
of the “essential nexus” test and the “rough proportionality” test to situations
where landowners are required to convey easements or title allowing public
access or fees in lieu of such requirements. 94 N.Y.2d 96 (1999). Bonnie Briar,
like the Mendon case, involved traditional zoning restrictions that limited the use
of the property and that fell short of total takings.
In Dolan, the City of Tigard required a site plan developer to dedicate a
portion of her property lying within a 100-year floodplain for the improvement of a
storm drainage system along a nearby creek and an additional 15-foot strip of
land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. The conditions
required the owner to convey an easement to the city allowing it and the public
access to her land. The landowner objected, claiming that these requirements
were not calculated to mitigate the impact of the proposed development and,
therefore, constituted an uncompensated taking.

Citing Nollan, the Court stated that when dedication conditions are
imposed on a land use permit, they must bear an “essential nexus” to a
legitimate public objective. In view of clear findings regarding the seriousness of
the flooding and traffic problems in the city and along the creek, such a nexus
was found. The Court went on to establish, for the first time, a test that is to be
used to determine “the required degree of connection between the [dedication
conditions] and the projected impact of the proposed development.” Dolan, 512
U.S. at 377. For this purpose, the Court wrote, “we think a term such as ‘rough
proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” Id.
at 391 (emphasis added).
In Dolan, the Court found that the City had not shown why a dedicated
public greenway, rather than a private one, was required in the interest of flood
control. In regard to the pedestrian/bicycle path dedication, the Court held that
the city’s finding that the path “could offset some of the traffic demand” was too
general. Id. at 389. The City did not “meet its burden of demonstrating that the
additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner’s
development reasonably relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.” Id. at 395. The Court required the City
to “make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication . . .
beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand
generated.” Id. at 395-96. The imposition of the burden of proof on the regulator,
the stricter scrutiny used, and the failure to presume the validity of the City’s
determinations are uniquely applicable to cases where exactions are challenged.
Recently, the Court of Appeals clarified the applicability of the “rough
proportionality” test to fixed fee schedules that apply to all subdivisions approved
in a community. In Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 769
N.Y.S.2d 445 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that the town’s fixed recreational
fee schedule is not an exaction subject to higher judicial scrutiny. In Twin Lakes,
the Court of Appeals consulted Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687
(1999), to determine whether such fees are exactions. Twin Lakes Development
Corp., 769 N.Y.S.2d 445, 449. In Monterey, the Court declined to extend the
strict scrutiny analysis to cases in which the plaintiff challenges a denial of a
development permit. In dicta, the Court stated that “land-use decisions
conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use”
and, by extension, fees in lieu of such dedication, are exactions. See Monterey,
526 U.S. at 703.
In Smith, the Court of Appeals found that under the doctrinal framework of
the Supreme Court, the conservation restriction was not an exaction subject to
the Nollan/Dolan tests. The court declined “to extend the concept of exaction
where there is no dedication of property to public use and the restriction merely

places conditions on development.” Smith at *13. The court reviewed the case
using the Penn Central/Agins test and found that the conservation restriction did
not constitute a taking. “The application of a general zoning law to particular
property effects a taking if the law does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins, 447
U.S. 255 at 260. The restriction did not deny the Smiths all economically viable
use of their property. It is unclear whether the restriction would have any effect
on the market value of the property because under the preexisting overlay
districts the “encumbered parts of the property had almost no development value
before the Town announced the restriction.” Smith at *17.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that “the conservation restriction
substantially advances a legitimate government purpose – environmental
preservation.” Id. at *17-*18. “Ensuring perpetual protection for open space –
along with the resources and habitats they shelter – from the vicissitudes of
workaday land-use battles is hardly an inconsequential governmental interest.”
Id. at *19. The imposition of a conservation restriction is a “’well established land
use tool’ that is ‘consistent with the State’s longstanding commitment to
protecting … critical natural resources.’” Id.

